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Mandatory Detention: The Fourth Circuit Upholds
Charlottesville's Juvenile Curfew Ordinance
INTRODUCTION

Recently public concern over juvenile crime has escalated.1
Some studies show juvenile crime has increased 2 while others suggest the opposite.3 Either way, more and more communities in the
U.S. are enacting juvenile curfew ordinances to alleviate this concern. 4 Communities and legislatures have used justifications such
as drug problems and violent behavior, 5 gang activity, 6 juvenile
crime, 7 and parental responsibility 8 to enact juvenile curfew
ordinances.
I See generally Jeremy Toth, Juvenile Curfew: Legal Perspectives and Be-

yond, 14 IN PUB. INTEREST 39 (1995).
2 See, e.g., Serious Juvenile Crime Cases Skyrocket, NEw

HAVEN REG., July
25, 1995, at A8 (reporting that "the number of juvenile court cases involving serious offenses such as murders and aggravated assaults grew 68% between 1988 and
1992"); Walter Updegrave, You're Safer Than You Think, MONEY, June 1, 1994, at
114 (saying FBI statistics demonstrate that in 1992, out of the 641,250 arrests for
violent crimes, teenagers age 15-19 accounted for 22%); John Larrabee, t 21, R.I.
Serial Killer Soon Will Go Free-'There's No Doubt' He'll Strike Again, USA ToDAY, June 6, 1994, at 8A (saying the juvenile homicide rate increased 130% since
1987).
3 See, e.g., Howard N. Snyder, Juvenile Arrests 1995, Juv. JUST. BULL., Feb.
1997, at 1 (stating the juvenile arrests for murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault have declined 3%); Kevin Johnson & Gary Fields, 'Young and the
Ruthless' Never Materialized, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 1997, at Al (reporting juvenile
arrests for violent crime decreased 9% in 1996).
4 See Arnold Binder, Restrictions on Youth Strain Families, Burden Government, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, at B1 (stating juvenile curfew laws are on the
increase).
5 See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
6 See Note, Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution, 76 MIcH. L.
REV. 109, 111 (1977).
7 See Gary Peter Klahr, The Legal War on the Young Continues, 30 ARIZ.
Arr'Y. 15 (July 1994).
8 See DeNeen L. Brown & Stephen Buckley, Teens Set to Fightfor Right to
Party: Students Say Social DisasterLurks in Plan to Curb Drunken Driving, WASH.
POST, Mar. 4, 1993, at B1 (quoting a parental support group coordinator saying a
"curfew, while it seems to be pretty radical, could be a real tool to help parents
who are having trouble with their children").
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A typical juvenile curfew applies to persons under the age of
179 or 18.10 The duration of a curfew may be lenient, such as from
11:00p.m. until 6:00a.m., Sunday-Thursday, and 12:00a.m. until
6:00a.m., Friday-Saturday. 1 Or, duration may be strict, such as
10:00p.m. through daylight for the entire week.' 2 A juvenile curfew
ordinance usually offers exceptions when the curfew does not apply,' 3 such as when juveniles are exercising their First Amendment
rights, running an errand for a parent, or engaging in employment.14 Juveniles who violate a curfew are usually charged with a
misdemeanor 5 and may typically be fined up to $500.00.16 Also,
parents who knowingly allow their children to violate the curfew
7
can be subject to criminal liability.'
The City of Charlottesville, Virginia, like many other cities, is
not immune from nationwide increases in juvenile crime.' 8 On December 16, 1996, in response to a variety of evidence, 19 Charlottesville amended its City Code to include a juvenile nocturnal curfew

ordinance.2 0 The City identified three purposes for the curfew: (1)
reduction of juvenile crime and violence; (2) protection of juveniles
from the dangers of drugs and crime victimization; and (3) enhancement of parental responsibility. 2 1 The Charlottesville curfew provides eight exceptions that restrict the curfew.2 2 Violators of the
v. Strauss, 11 F. 3d 488, 497 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing DALLAS, TEX.,
ch. 31, § 31-33 (1992)).
10 Nunez v. San Diego, 114 F. 3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing SAN DIEGO,
CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE art. 8, § 58.01 (1947)).
9 See Qutb

CODE

11 Id.

Id.
13 See Craig Hemmens & Katherine Bennett, Out in the Street: Juvenile
Crime, Juvenile Curfews, and the Constitution, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 267, 274 (1988-9).
14 See Strauss, 11 F. 3d at 497 (citing DALLAS, TEX., CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33
(c) (B), (D), (H)).
15 See Nunez, 114 F. 3d at 938 (citing SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE
art. 8, § 58.01.2).
16 See Strauss, 11 F. 3d at 497 (citing DALLAS, TEX., CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33 (e)
(1)).
17 See Nunez, 114 F. 3d at 938 (citing SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE
art. 8, § 58.01.1).
18 See Schleifer v. Charlottesville, 159 F. 3d 843, 848 (4th Cir. 1998).
19 Id. at 849.
20 Id. at 846.
21 Id. at 847 (quoting CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA., CODE § 17-7, Intro.).
22 See CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA., CODE § 17-7 (b) (1-8). Exceptions include
being accompanied by a parent; involved in an emergency; engaged in employment, or to and from it; being on the sidewalk abutting their home; engaged in
12
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curfew are first given a verbal warning; 23 however, if the person has
already received a warning, he or she is charged with a violation of
25
the curfew, 24 which constitutes a misdemeanor.
This Comment discusses the 4th Circuit's decision of Schleifer
v. City of Charlottesville to uphold Charlottesville's juvenile curfew
ordinance as constitutional. Part I considers the fundamental rights
distinction between minors and adults. Part II discusses how courts
treat specific fundamental rights. Part III examines the differing
standards of judicial review. Part IV analyzes the Schleifer court's
decision. Part V explains what I believe the Schleifer court should
have done. This Comment concludes that the Charlottesville juvenile curfew ordinance is clearly unconstitutional. Because fundamental rights of children are at stake, the Schleifer court should
have applied strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny. Despite the Schleifer court's holding otherwise, 26 a strict scrutiny analysis should have rendered the ordinance unconstitutional for equal
protection and vagueness violations. Instead, as a result of the decision, the Fourth Circuit "[r]elegates kids to second-class citizenship
27
by upholding Charlottesville's nighttime curfew for minors.
I.

THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DISTINCTION BETWEEN

MINORS AND ADULTS

A.

Minor's and Adult's Rights Are not Coextensive

Juveniles, like adults, have constitutionally protected fundamental rights.28 The constitution does not decline to extend rights
to children purely because they are children. 29 Veritably, the
United States Supreme Court has enunciated that "[c]onstitutional
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority. '30 Past Supreme Court
decisions provide further proof that children have constitutionally
certain religious, civic, or school activities; being on an errand for a parent; interstate travel beginning or terminating in the city; First Amendment activities. Id.
23 Id. at I 17- ()1).
24 Id. at § 17-7 (g)( 2
25 Id. at § 17-7 h .
26 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 847.
27
28
29
30

Id. at 858 (Michael, J., dissenting).
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972).
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) [Hereinafter Bellotti].
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74

(1976) [Hereinafter Planned Parenthood].
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protected rights; specifically, minors have significant First Amendment protections 31 and 14th Amendment and certain Bill of Rights
protections.

32

Despite pronouncements that minors possess constitutional
rights, their rights are not coextensive with adult's constitutional
rights. 33 The Supreme Court has declared that states have the

power to restrict minor's rights with greater force than it could with
adult's rights.34 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not provided
35
a uniform framework to decide when those restrictions may apply.

B.

The Use of Bellotti v. Baird to Restrict Minor's Rights

The United States Supreme Court has never chosen to review
the issue of the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances.

36

In

fact, the Court has actively refused to grant certiorari on the issue. 37
Despite this, many lower courts have turned to the Supreme Court
case of Bellotti v. Baird for assistance. 38 The issue in Bellotti concerned a statute that required minors under the age of 18 to receive
31
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-4
(1969) (holding minor's possess free expression right); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding minor's possess freedom of
religion and expression rights).
32 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-1 (1967) (holding minor's possess due process rights in juvenile delinquency proceedings); Planned Parenthood,428 U.S. at
74-5 (holding minor's possess privacy right); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 527-9
(1975) (holding minor's possess double jeopardy protection); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (requiring burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt in
juvenile delinquency proceedings).
33 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968); Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995).
34 See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631-3 (1968) (upholding a state regulation
of the sale of pornographic materials to children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (recognizing that the state has more power to regulate activities of minors than it does with adults).
35 See infra Part I.B.
36 See Frank DeLucia, Connecticut's Juvenile Curfew Ordinances:An Effective Means for Curbing Juvenile Crime, or an UnconstitutionalDeprivation of Minors' FundamentalRights?, 15 Q.L.R. 357, 365 (1995).
37 See, e.g., Outb v. Bartlett, 511 U.S. 1127 (1994) (denying petition for writ
of certiorari); Schleifer v. Charlottesville, 143 L.Ed. 2d 349 (1999) (denying petition for writ of certiorari); Bykofsky v. Middletown, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (denying
petition for writ of certiorari).
38 See Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73
WASH. U. L. Q. 1315, 1337-8 (1995) (saying that Bellotti is the foundation of most
juvenile curfew analyses).
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parental consent before receiving an abortion. 39 The Bellotti court,
in a four Justice plurality opinion, announced three justifications for
treating minor's constitutional rights differently than adults rights:
(1) the peculiar vulnerability of children; (2) children's inability to
make critical decision in an informed mature manner; and (3) the
importance of the parental role in child rearing. 40 However, bein
cause the Supreme Court has not endorsed using the Bellotti test
42
juvenile curfew cases, 41 its application has been incongruous.
When used correctly, the Bellotti test could actually become
the second prong of a two-part test to determine when a state has
the necessary interests to justify restricting minor's rights.43 The
44
first prong of the test determines the nature of the right at risk.
For example, the right at risk can be a fundamental right, such as
the right to vote, 45 or it can be a non-fundamental right, such as
education. 46 The nature of the right decides the level of scrutiny
that is incorporated in the second step; namely, measuring and evaluating the state's interests. 47 The Bellotti test is not used to determine the nature of the rights at risk, but to provide a backdrop
upon which to measure the state interest in regulating those
rights.48 However, the Bellotti factors only become relevant under
strict scrutiny; this is because it is the only standard of review,
where absent certain factors, the law requires equal treatment of
minors and adults. 49 Thus, in the case of fundamental rights, (which
requires strict scrutiny), the state needs to provide sufficient interests (consistent with the Bellotti factors) in order to justify regulat39 See Bellotti, 443
40

Id. at 634.

U.S. at 625.

41 See id. at 642; Cf.Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E. 2d 12, 16 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (stating that the use of the Bellotti factors outside the abortion rights situation is "troublesome.").
42
Cf.Strauss, 11 F. 3d at 492, n.6 (finding a juvenile curfew ordinance constitutional without using the Bellotti factors because all parties agreed that the state
have sufficient interests to regulate minors); McCollester v. Keene, 586 F. Supp.
1381, 1385-6 (D.N.H. 1984) (striking down a juvenile curfew ordinance because it
did not withstand Bellotti analysis); see also, Tona Trollinger, The Juvenile Curfew:
Unconstitutional Imprisonment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 949, 990 (1996).
43 See Brian Privor, Dusk 'Til Dawn: Children's Rights and the Effectiveness
of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REV. 415, 433 (1999).

4

Id.

45 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S.533 (1964).
46

See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

47 See Privor, supra note 43.
48

See Trollinger, supra note 42.

49 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 863 (Michael, J., dissenting).
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ing the minor's rights more stringently than adults, when otherwise,
the state would have to treat them equally. 50
C. Incorrect Use of the Bellotti Factors
Some courts incorrectly use the Bellotti test to reason that because a state has sufficient interests consistent with the Bellotti factors, the minor's right at risk is less than fundamental. 51 If this were
the correct reasoning, as soon as the sufficient state interests were
demonstrated, the conclusion of "less than fundamental rights"
would almost necessarily follow. 52 As one commentator notes, "it
is a case of putting the cart before the horse by inquiring from the
outset about government's justifications for abridging a liberty
would leave us without guidance in deciding how strong a justification to demand. ' 53 Thus, to ensure a proper analysis, the nature of
the right at risk should be determined separately and before the
decision of whether a state has the sufficient interests (consistent
with the Bellotti factors) to justify restricting minor's rights more
54
than adult's.

D. The Use of Bellotti to Restrict Minor's Rights in
Juvenile Curfew Cases
Some courts analyze a municipality's ordinance using the Bellotti factors, decide upon their evaluation that the state has sufficient interests to regulate minors conduct greater than it would
50 See, e.g., Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W. 2d 363, 371-2 (Iowa 1989)
(Lavorato, J., dissenting) (saying that minors' rights are not less fundamental than
adults' and that special governmental interests are needed to treat them differently); Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 864 (Michael, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's
holding that a minor's rights can be regulated more stringently than adults without
sufficient reasons).
5' See, e.g., Simmons, 445 N.W. 2d at 368-9 (using Bellotti factors to decided
minor's right to move freely is not fundamental and therefore, only applying rational basis review); Bykofsky v. Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1253-8 (M.D. Pa.
1975) (case prior to Bellotti, deciding that governmental interests in regulating minor's behavior indicates minor's right to move freely is not fundamental, even
though it is fundamental with respect to adults).
52 See Federle, supra note 38, at 1350 (discussing how the a court's analysis
would become a tautology: "Children's fundamental rights are not violated because the state may treat them differently, and the state has greater authority to
regulate their activities because children's rights are not as extensive as those held
by adults").
53 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 96 (1992).
54 See Privor, supra note 43, at 434-5.
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adults, and thus uphold the curfew ordinance. 55 One such case is.
Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg.56 In Greenberg, the Village of
Deerfield enacted a juvenile curfew ordinance that made it unlawful for persons under age 18 to be in public during curfew hours. 57
Greenberg, age 17, was charged with a violation of the ordinance
after being found in public during curfew hours, and proceeded to
challenge the ordinance on the ground that it unconstitutionally restricted his right to move freely. 58 The court first determined that
the ordinance would be unconstitutional if applied to adults,
thereby determining the right at risk to be fundamental (thereby
fulfilling the first prong of a correct Bellotti analysis).5 9 Greenberg
cited the Bellotti factors in his defense, but the court stated that it
was bound by precedent to apply People v. Chambers.60 Chambers
was a pre-Bellotti decision where the Illinois Supreme Court validated a juvenile curfew ordinance. 61 However, the Greenberg court
engaged in a Bellotti factor analysis anyway (thereby fulfilling the
second prong of a correct Bellotti analysis). 62 The court found that
the 1st and 3rd Bellotti factors were present, and that the Illinois
Supreme Court in Chambers considered these factors in reaching
its decision. 63 Thus, the court concluded that since its decision (after
a Bellotti analysis) and Chambers were consistent, precedent required the determination that the state had authority to regulate
minor's conduct more so than adult's, and thus validated the juve64
nile curfew ordinance.
E. Rejecting the Use of Bellotti to Restrict Minor's rights in
Juvenile Curfew Cases
Some courts have used the Bellotti factors to determine that
juvenile curfew ordinances are unconstitutional. 65 Indeed, several
courts did not find that the mere presence of the Bellotti factors
compelled a conclusion that a minor's behavior may be regulated
55
56
57
58

59
60
61
62
63

64
65

See, e.g., People ex rel. J.M., 768 P. 2d 219, 223 (Colo. 1989).
See Deerfield, 550 N.E. 2d at 16.

Id. at 13-4.
Id. at 12-3.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15-6.
See People v. Chambers, 360 N.E. 2d 55, 59 (11. 1976).
See Deerfield, 550 N.E. 2d at 16.
Id.
Id. at 16-7.
See DeLucia, supra note 36, at 369-70.
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more stringently than an adult's behavior. 66 The court in Waters v.
Barry67 took this exact approach. In Waters, the D.C. legislature
adopted a curfew that made it unlawful for persons under age 18 to
be in public during curfew hours (11:00p.m.-6:00a.m. Sunday to
Thursday; 12:00a.m.-6:00a.m. Friday to Saturday). 6 8 The court held
that the ordinance was unconstitutional because of both 1st and 5th
Amendment violations. 69 The Waters court considered the District's argument 70 that minor's constitutional rights are unequal
with an adult's rights, and thus may be regulated in a way that
adults right's cannot. 7 1 However, the court disagreed with the District's contention. The court decided that in the area of fundamental rights, minor's rights and adult's rights are equal, and thus strict
scrutiny applies (correctly using the first prong of the test in determining the nature of the right at risk). 72 Then, the court proceeded
to the second prong; namely, the Bellotti factor analysis. 7 3 With respect to the 1st Bellotti factor, the court called violence "ubiquitous," and that its danger posed no more a peculiar threat to minors
as it does to adults. 74 For the 2nd factor, the court stated that the
decision to go out at night will rarely have "serious consequences"
and "does not ineluctably lead to nighttime violence. '75 Finally,
with regard to the 3rd factor, the court said that by vesting parental
responsibility in the state and the police, the ordinance frustrates
rather than fosters parental responsibility. 76 Thus, the court con66
See, e.g., Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 185-6 (Iowa 1992) (holding the juvenile curfew ordinance was overbroad, and thus application of the Bellotti factors was unnecessary); Johnson v. Opelousas, 658 F. 2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir.
Unit A Oct. 1981) (holding the curfew ordinance was overbroad and denying the
presence of the 2nd Bellotti factor in situations covered by the ordinance); Allen v.
Bordentown, 524 A. 2d 478, 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (following Johnson analysis and holding the curfew violated the Equal protection Clause); Keene,
586 F. Supp. at 1385-6 (holding the curfew overbroad and that Bellotti factors "do
not come into play where the innocent behavior of the juvenile creates no risk of
delinquent activity.").
67 See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1125.
68 Id. at 1127.
69

Id. at 1139.

Id. (district's argument is largely based upon the one used in Bykofsky,
401 F. Supp. at 1256).
70

71 See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1135.
72
Id. at 1138-9.
73 Id. at 1136-7.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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cluded that after a Bellotti analysis, "there is no basis for treating
' 77
juveniles differently than adults.

II.

COURTS RECOGNITION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

A.

Freedom of Movement

The most consequential fundamental right infringed by juvenile curfew ordinances is a minor's freedom of movement. 78 Over
the years, freedom of movement, although not enumerated in the
Constitution, has been guarded by the U.S. Supreme Court. 79 The
Court has even gone as far as saying freedom of movement is
"[b]asic in our scheme of values."80° Moreover, several lower courts
have decided that freedom of movement is a fundamental right.81
Thus, because a juvenile curfew ordinance impinges on a minor's
right to move freely during curfew hours, a fundamental right is
2
unduly compromised.
B.

Freedom of Association and other FirstAmendment Rights

The other constitutional dispute juvenile curfew ordinances
usually raise is the restriction on freedom of association. 83 Freedom
of association is well grounded in Supreme Court precedent.8 4 The
See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1136.
See Jeff A. Beaumont, Nunez and Beyond: An Examination of Nunez v.
City of San Diego and the Future of Nocturnal Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, 19 J.
Juv. L. 84, 111 (1998).
79
See, e.g., Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (saying
freedom of movement has historically been "[p]art of the amenities of life as we
have known them."); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920) (saying
that even from the time of the Articles of Confederation, citizens have had the
fundamental right to move freely within their states, and to have free access
thereto and therefrom).
80 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958).
81 See, e.g., Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134 (holding freedom of movement is a
fundamental right under the 1st & 5th Amendments); Russell, 484 N.W. 2d at 183
(saying when 1st Amendment rights involvement, such movement must be protected by the 1st Amendment).
82 See Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1254.
83 See Trollinger, supra note 42, at 978.
84 See, e.g., Apthekar v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964) (holding
that freedom of travel is closely related to freedom of speech and association, and
thus Congress cannot draft a statute constitutionally prohibiting travel); Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984) (saying freedom of association
flows from the 1st Amendment, is incidental to the exercise of the 1st Amendment,
and may itself be inherent in the 1st Amendment).
77
78
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Supreme Court acknowledges two situations where freedom of association applies: intimate relationships 85 and 1st Amendment affairs. 86 With respect to intimate relationships, freedom of
association is deemed an integral part of personal liberty. 87 As for
1st Amendment association, the Supreme Court has considered it
essential for exercising 1st Amendment freedoms. 88 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has extended the association right to include social
purposes.89 Thus, when a curfew restricts a minor from being in
public during curfew hours, it also divests that minor of the ability
to make intimate relationships 90 and exercise 1st Amendment
freedoms. 9 1

III.

JUDICIAL STANDARDS

OF REVIEW

The standard of review, rather than the facts of the case, is
usually outcome determinative in a case based on constitutional
law. 92 Individual rights do not receive equal protection under the
law; rather, a hierarchy exists.93 Strict scrutiny, the most rigorous
standard of review, is used in cases involving either a fundamental
right or a suspect classification. 94 The U.S. Supreme Court has referred to fundamental rights (such as those in the Bill of Rights) as
those that have been "[f]ound to be implicit in the concept of or97
96
dered liberty ... 95 According to the Court, race and religion
are the only suspect classes in all situations; age is not a suspect
classification. 98 Intermediate scrutiny, a less stringent standard of
85 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).

See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-619.
See Trollinger, supra note 42, at 979.
See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
89 See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) (acknowledging 1st
and 14th Amendment rights to congregate in public for social or political reasons);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-1 (1963) (saying free association includes
social aspects).
90 See Trollinger, supra note 42, at 980.
91 Id. at 981.
92 See Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 13, at 286; see generally, LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1022-39 (2d. ed. 1988).
93 Id.
94 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17.
95 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-5 (1937).
96 See Brown v. Bd of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
97 See Bykofsky, 401 F.Supp. at 1256; see also, TRIBE, supra note 92, at 1179.
98 See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 944.
86
87
88
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review, is used in certain classifications.99 Rational basis review is
used when the case involves neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification, and when intermediate scrutiny is
inappropriate. 100
A.

Rational Basis Review

Rational basis review, also known as the "roll-over-and-playdead" test, is the least stringent standard of review. 10 1 This is because as long as the disputed statute/law "[b]ears some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes," courts will uphold the
disputed legislation.10 2 Under this test, state actions are given a
presumption of validity.10 3 Moreover, reviewing courts do not
closely examine the effects of the legislation. 10 4 Generally, the
court will uphold any state statute that "[r]easonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction or difference in state policy.. . -105;
10 6
it need not be the best possible way.
B.

Intermediate Scrutiny

Disapproval of the rational basis test in gender-based classifications gave rise to intermediate scrutiny. 10 7 While not quite as rigorous as strict scrutiny review, intermediate scrutiny review
requires "sharper focus" than the "relatively deferential 'rational
basis' test." 10 8 Intermediate scrutiny necessitates that the disputed
statute/law serve "important governmental objectives" and that the
means used be "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives."' 0 9 Reviewing courts must find the justification "genuine, not hypothetical or invented post hoc in response to
litigation." 0
99 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981) (saying
intermediate scrutiny is used for gender-based classifications).
100 See Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 13, at 287.
101 Schleifer v. Charlottesville, 963 F.Supp. 534, 539 (W.D. Va. 1997).
102 Id.
103 See TRIBE, supra note 92, at 1444.
104 Id.
105
Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959).
106
See Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 13, at 289.
107
See TRIBE, supra note 92, at 1601-10.
108 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-1 (1976).
109 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
110 Id. at 532.
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C. Strict Scrutiny
In order to withstand strict scrutiny (the most rigorous standard of review), the disputed statute/law needs to "achieve a compelling governmental interest," and it must be "narrowly tailored to
achieve this result."1'11 'Narrowly tailored' means there must be a
"sufficient nexus between the stated governmental interest and the
class created by the ordinance,"' 112 and that the legislation uses the
least restrictive means to achieve its goal." 3 A reviewing court will
closely examine the purpose and effect of the statute/law rather
than defer to the legislature; no presumption of validity is given to
1 14
the state.
IV.

THE 4TH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN SCHLEIFER V.
CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE

A.

Determination of the Appropriate Judicial Standard of Review
The Schleifer court first determined the correct level of scrutiny applicable in the case.1' 5 The court considered plaintiff's argument that minors deserve protection under the Constitution, 16 and
admitted that minors deserve some constitutional rights before becoming adults." 7 However, the court cited several U.S. Supreme
Court decisions that minor's rights are not coextensive with
adults." 8 Citing Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court stated that because of this precedent, "[t]he state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults."11 9
In examining the case law, the court based its decision on two
determinations:
First, children do possess at least qualified rights, so an
ordinance which restricts their liberty to the extent that
this one does should be subject to more than rational
basis review. Second, because children do not possess
1MI Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-7 (1982).
112 See Nunez, 114 F. 3d at 946.
113 See Strauss, 11 F. 3d at 492.
114 See TRIBE, supra note 92, at 1022-3 & 1058-9.
115 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 846.
116
Id. at 847.
117
Id.
118 See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682; Bellotti,
443 U.S. at 634; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638; Prince, 321 U.S. at 168; Vernonia Sch.

Dist., 515 U.S. at 654.
119

See Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
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the same rights as adults, the ordinance should be sub120
ject to less than the strictest level of scrutiny.
Therefore, the court determined that the best judicial standard of
review to apply is intermediate scrutiny. 121 As a result, the court
needed to determine whether the ordinance is "substantially related" to "important" governmental interests. 122 However, despite
this conclusion, the court stated that the ordinance would also sur123
vive strict scrutiny.
B.

The Effect of Intermediate Scrutiny: No Bellotti Analysis

When minors and adults have the same rights, certain considerations specific to the former come into play, and when present, justify the state's authority to regulate minor's rights more stringently
than adult's. 24 These considerations are the Bellotti factors: "the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the
parental role in child rearing."'12 5 Therefore, only the presence of
these factors entitles the government to restrict minor's rights with
greater force than it can adult's rights. 126 However, the Schleifer
court found that minors do not possess the same fundamental rights
as adults, and thus applied intermediate scrutiny. 127 Thus, the court
did not engage in a Bellotti analysis (since it is relevant only when
minors and adults have equal rights) and proceeded to evaluate the
city's interests under the "substantially related" to "important" gov28
ernment interest test of intermediate scrutiny.1
C. Evaluation of the State's Purposes
The Charlottesville legislature posited three purposes for the
juvenile curfew ordinance. 2 9 The first purpose was the reduction
of juvenile violence and crime in the city.' 30 The second purpose
was for protection of minors from unlawful drug activity and from
120
121
122

See Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847.

Id. at 847.
Id. (quoting Hogan, 456 U.S. at 724).

123

Id.

124
125

Id. at 863 (Michael, J., dissenting).
See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
Id. at 633-639.
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 847.
See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 847.

126
127
128
129

130

Id.
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the possibility of becoming the victims of older perpetrators of
crime. 131 The third and final purpose was to foster parental
32
responsibility.
The court evaluated the first purpose through two different avenues. 133 First, the court looked to past Supreme Court decisions. 134 In Schall v. Martin, the Court acknowledged that "[t]he
'legitimate and compelling state interest' in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted.' 3 5 Further, in Brown v. Texas,
the Court called protecting the community from crime "a weighty
social objective."' 136 The Schleifer court called this the most fundamental interest in government, and that "this interest persists undi137
luted in the juvenile context ....
Second, the court looked to the national and local increases in
juvenile crime. 138 The court considered testimony by a criminology
expert saying juvenile crime, like the national trend, was also increasing in Charlottesville.139 Next, the court contemplated the
city's report, from its Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, that its
caseload increased 25% from 1991-1996.140 Finally, the court
weighed the city's evidence of a high rate of juvenile recidivism and
an increase in violence in juvenile crime.' 4' With all this information, the court concluded that the city's first purpose was "undenia142
bly compelling."
The court also evaluated the city's second purpose, protecting
juveniles from harm and crime, with prior Supreme Court decisions. 143 The Supreme Court has always recognized the "streets" as
threatening to children 44, and according to the Schleifer court, today the threat has materialized in the form of violent crime and
131
132
133

Id.

Id.
Id.

134 Id.
135 Schall

v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (quoting De Veau v. Braisted,
363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)).
136
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
137 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 847 (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 264-5).
138

Id.

139
140

Id. at 848.
Id.

141

Id.

142

Id. at 847.
See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); Ginsberg, 390 U.S

143

at 640; Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67.
144 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 169.
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drugs. 1 45 Moreover, various lower courts have acknowledged the
impact of dangerous urban life on vulnerable children. 46 Each
child, the court says, "[r]isks becoming another victim of the assaults, violent crimes, and drug wars that plague America's cities."'1 47 Further, two Charlottesville police officers provided
evidence that children on the city's streets during curfew hours are
at a marked risk. 48 Thus, the court found that the city's second
'149
purpose was "well-established.
The court labels the city's third purpose, supporting parental
responsibility, as "significant. ' 150 Once more, the court looks to Supreme Court cases for direction.' 5' The Supreme Court describes

parental responsibility as something that should be shared between
parents and the state. 1 52 Further, the Court says parental responsibility should be complemented and guided by the state. 153 Lastly,
the Court said "[t]he state is appropriately concerned with the integrity of the family unit."' 54 Therefore, the Schleifer court determined that the city's third purpose constituted "an important
governmental purpose. '155
D.

Evaluation of the Means by which the Ordinance Seeks to
Achieve its Goals

The plaintiffs, in addition to attacking the city's purposes behind the ordinance, also attacked the means by which the ordinance
purported to achieve its goals. 1 56 The court agreed with the plaintiff's argument that the curfew "must be shown to be a meaningful
step toward solving a real, not fanciful problem."'1 57 However, the
court did not accept plaintiffs' challenge and noted that this burden
'45
146

See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 848.
See, e.g., Nunez, 114 F. 3d at 947; In re Appeal in Maricopa County, Juve-

nile Action No. JT9065297, 887 P. 2d 599, 606 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); J.M., 768 P.
2d at 223; Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1257.
147 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 848.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.

Id.
See, e.g., Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-66; Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the
Holy Names of the Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
151
152

'53
154

155

See Bellotti, 443 U.S.at 637.

Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977).
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 849.

156

Id.

157

Id.
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does "not demand of legislatures 'scientifically certain criteria of
legislation."' ' 58 Moreover, the court observed that it should not
substitute its judgment for the legislatures, despite the unknown ef159
fects the curfew may have.
The court defended the means of the ordinance via its first purpose largely by deferring to legislative judgment. 160 First, the court
said that the city, upon hearing a variety of evidence, from a variety
of sources (police reports, public opinion, news reports, information
from the U.S. Dept. of Justice, national crime reports, etc.), was
justified in believing that "keeping unsupervised juveniles off the
streets late at night will make for a safer community.' 6 1 Second,
after attack on the city's exclusion of 17 year old persons from the
ordinance, the court said it was "loath to second-guess" the legislature's decision. 62 Third, the court said that, based upon the aforementioned variety of evidence, the city was permitted to believe
juvenile crime was a problem in Charlottesville. 63 Finally, and logically next in sequence, the court said the city was entitled to enact
a juvenile curfew ordinance in hopes of reducing juvenile crime,
and should not have their choice aborted before having a chance to
164
work.
In defending the city's second purpose, protecting juveniles
from crime, the court also deferred to legislative judgment. 65 The
plaintiffs argued that the streets are not a distinctly dangerous place
for minors.' 66 Rather, plaintiff's contended that most violence
against minors occurs by family members and friends. 167 However,
the court stated that just because the curfew does not completely
solve the juvenile crime problem, does not mean the city cannot
attempt to solve the juvenile crime problem on the streets. 168 Further, the city relied on local and national crime reports that documented the juvenile crime problem on the streets. 169 Thus, the
158 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642-3 (quoting Noble State Bank v. Hasker, 219
U.S. 575 (1911)).
159 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 849.
160 Id. at 849-51.
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id.
Id. at 850.
Id.

Id.

168

See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 850-51.
Id. at 850.
Id.
See id.

169

Id.

167

2000]

MANDATORY DETENTION

851

court reasoned, "the Constitution certainly does not put legislatures
to the choice of solving the entirety of a social problem or no part
170
of it at all."
Lastly, the plaintiffs attacked the city's third purpose: providing support to the parental role of child rearing. 17 1 Plaintiffs characterize the ordinance, based upon parental testimony, as unwanted
and unnecessary. 17 2 The court responded to this argument in three
ways. First, the curfew helps parents keep children off the streets
when their own efforts to do so have failed. 173 Second, the curfew
pushes parents to take a more meaningful role in their children's
lives. 174 Third, the curfew helps parents who want their children to
use their time more productively, as opposed to spending it on the
streets. 17 5 Furthering the court's view, the court noted that the city
176
acted on substantial public endorsement for the curfew.
E. The Schleifer Courts' Response to the Unconstitutionally
Vague Challenge
The plaintiffs also argued that several of the ordinance's exceptions were unconstitutionally vague.' 77 A law will not be deemed
void for vagueness as long as it "(1) establishes 'minimal guidelines
to govern law enforcement,' and (2) gives reasonable notice of the
proscribed conduct."'1 78 Further, when criminal penalties are imposed, "the standard of certainty is higher."' 7 9 Despite these pronouncements, the court is quick to note that clarity in a criminal
statute is never perfect, so that it may be "[b]oth general enough to
take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are
prohibited."' 80
The court also noted at the outset its antipathy at striking down
ordinances as void for vagueness.' 8' The court said it would much
170

Id. at 851.

171
172

Id.
Id.
Id.

173

174
175

Id.

See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 851 (4th Cir. 1998).
Id.
177 Id. at 853.
178 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 853 (quoting Elliot v. Administrator, Animal &
Plant Health Inspection Serv., 990 F. 2d 140, 145 (4th Cir. 1993).
179 Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n. 8 (1983).
180 Id. (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
181 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 853.
176
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rather strike down a specific application of a law, than invalidate
the law as a whole. 182 Thus, the court would rather use judicial restraint to avoid invalidating laws and then deal with challenges on a
18 3
case-by-case basis.
The first provisional attack by plaintiffs is on the First Amendment exception. 8 4 Under the exception, behavior is exempt from
the curfew when a minor is "exercising First Amendment rights
protected by the U.S. Constitution, such as free exercise of religion,
freedom of speech, and the right of assembly."' 18 5 Plaintiffs assert
that the ordinance (1) accords law enforcement officers complete
discretion in its enforcement, and (2) forces children to learn constitutional law in order to understand it.186
However, the court refused to "punish the city for its laudable
effort to respect the First Amendment.' 87 The court felt the exception fosters First Amendment values, rather than weakens
them.' 8 8 Thus, the court decided it would not belittle the city's at89
tempt to protect expressive activity.'
Moreover, the court did not feel unrestrained discretion is
given to law enforcement officials enforcing the ordinance. 90
Every criminal law, the court states, grants discretion to those enforcing it.' 91 However, the chance of abuse of that discretion does
not force a court to invalidate that law.' 92 Plaintiffs rely on testimony of the city's police chief, whose answer to a hypothetical
question about the First Amendment exception seemed to reaffirm
the proposition that abuse of discretion is likely.1 93 The court responded that "such hedged deposition testimony about a speculative hypothetical does not demonstrate that police will enforce the
94
curfew arbitrarily.'
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA., CODE
186

See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 853.

187

Id.

188

Id.

§ 17-7 (b) (8).

189 Id.

o90See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 854.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193
194

Id.
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 854; See also Village of Hoffman Estates v.

Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 503 (1982).
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Plaintiff's second vagueness challenge is in the term "civic" as
used in the ordinance's exception for activities sponsored by civic
organizations. 195 Plaintiffs rely on the Supreme Court, who invalidated a door-to-door solicitation ordinance exception that included
the phrase, "borough civic groups and organizations."' 96 However,
the court did not read Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell as standing for
197
per se vagueness of any statutory use of the word "civic.
Rather, the Hynes court found "civic" was just one of a number of
unclear terms in the statute. 198 On the contrary, the city of Charlottesville, the court urged, intended "civic" to be understood as its
ordinary, everyday dictionary definition. 199 Thus, the court refused
to find such "[u]se of the term civic to suffer an ambiguity of consti20 0
tutional magnitude.
Finally, the plaintiff's challenged the exception in the ordinance where a child is involved in an emergency. 20 1 Plaintiffs contended there are many possible situations when it is impossible to
tell if the curfew will apply. 20 2 However, the court responded that
mere possibilities will not render the exception void for
vagueness. 203
F. The Schleifer Courts' Conclusion
The Schleifer court concluded that the city's interests were
within the intermediate scrutiny standards, 204 and that the ordinance was not void for vagueness. 20 5 In sum, the court said the
ordinance "[c]omfortably satisfies constitutional standards. 2 0 6 The
court based the totality of its opinion on the "[b]elief that communities possess constitutional latitude in devising solutions to the per2 0°7
sistent problem of juvenile crime.
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 854.
See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 621 (1976).
197 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 854.
198 See Hynes, 425 U.S. at 621.
199 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 854.
200
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 854; See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 854.
201
195
196

202

Id.

203

See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 854; See also American Comm. Ass'n. v. Douds,

339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950).
204
205
206

See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 849.

207

Id.

Id. at 854.
Id. at 855.
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V.

WHAT THE SCHLIEFER COURT SHOULD HAVE DONE

A.

Choosing the Appropriate Judicial Standard of Review

The Charlottesville ordinance, by prohibiting children under 17
from being in public during curfew hours, operates through an
aged-based classification, and thus is bound by the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment.2 0 8 Usually, aged-based classification laws are subject to rational basis review. 20 9 Thus, the ordinance is validated as long as there is a rational basis underlying the
2 10
classification's use to achieve a legitimate governmental purpose.
But, when an aged-based classification infringes upon fundamental
211
rights, strict scrutiny is required.
1. Fundamental Rights Are Infringed Upon by the Ordinance
The Charlottesville ordinance does infringe upon fundamental
2 12
rights (e.g., First Amendment rights and freedom of movement).
However, the Schleifer court found that because only minors are
affected by the ordinance, the Equal Protection Clause requires
only intermediate scrutiny.2 13 The court should have followed the
lead of the 5th and 9th circuits, in deciding whenever fundamental
21 4
rights are impinged, strict scrutiny must be applied.
2.

Why Strict Scrutiny Should Apply

Minors' rights under the constitution are basically equal to
those of adults'. 215 However, there may be, in some situations, "sig208 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 859 (Michael, J. dissenting).
209 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991); Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
210 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 321, 319-21 (1997).
211 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Austin v. Michigan Chambers
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990).
212 Cf Nunez, 114 F. 3d at 944-45 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that San Diego's
juvenile curfew ordinance does impinge upon minor's fundamental rights); Qutb,
11 F.3d at 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (assuming the Dallas' juvenile curfew ordinance at
issue implicates minor's fundamental rights); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
358 91983) (finding a loitering statute affects First Amendment liberties and freedom of movement right); Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1139 (D.D.C. 1989) (concluding
the D.C. juvenile curfew ordinance "directly burdens First Amendment and fifth
Amendment liberty interests" of minors affected by the ordinance).
213 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 847.
214 Id. at 865-66 (Michael, J., dissenting); Nunez, 114 F. 3d at 945-46; Qutb,
11 F. 3d at 492.
215 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 862 (Michael, J., dissenting).
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nificant state interest[s] . . that [are] not present in the case of an
adult" that will justify the state's greater authority to regulate children. 2 16 Therefore, when the appropriate interests are present,
greater regulation can be exercised over minors - not because minors are unequal to adults, but because certain state interests pass
2 17
strict scrutiny review.
Justice Marshall, in H.L. v. Materson,218 echoed this logic. In
Matherson, the Supreme Court upheld a statute requiring parental
notification before a minor has an abortion. 21 9 The majority's decision was based upon the grounds that the statute furthered "important state interests" and was "narrowly drawn to protect only those
interests. '220 Justice Marshall, dissenting in the judgment, expressed support for the majority's test, and observed that under
such a test, minors' rights are not inferior to adults', but that appro22 1
priate state interests justified greater regulation of those rights.
Thus, fundamental rights of minors should be equal with those of
adults, and should likewise be protected under strict scrutiny
222
analysis.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's analysis of minors' rights supports this conclusion. 223 The Supreme Court has said that
"[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights. ' 22 4 Furthermore, minors cannot be
denied constitutional protection solely because of their age. 225 The
Court has also said that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and
216

Id. (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75).

217

Id. at 862-63.

218

H.L. v. Matherson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).

219
220

Id. at 413.

Id.

Id at 441-42, n. 32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 863 (Michael, J., dissenting); Nunez, 114 F. 3d at
945; See also Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile
Curfews and the Constitution , 97 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1171 (1984) (saying minor's
rights "should be presumptively equal to those of adults, and violations of such
rights should merit strict scrutiny).
223 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 863 (Michael, J., dissenting).
224 See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74; See also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (stating
"[s]tudents ... are persons under our Constitution [who] are possessed of fundamental rights which the state must respect"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)
(saying "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the 14th Amendment nor
the bill of Rights is for adults alone").
225 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633 (saying "A child, merely on account of his
221
222

minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution").
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come into being magically when one attains the state defined age of
226
majority.,
Thus, generally speaking, minors "[a]re protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as
adults. '22 7 However, there are cases that, when Bellotti factors are
present, justify the state's having enhanced authority to regulate minors' rights.2 2 8 This compels the conclusion that in order for the
state to possess this enhanced authority to regulate minors, the Bellotti factors must support it.229 "'It is only upon such a premise that
a state may deprive children of. . . rights [when a similar deprivation] would be constitutionally intolerable for adults."' 230
The Schleifer court would use a "categorical approach" and apply intermediate scrutiny in all cases involving minors, even in the
cases where the state does not possess interests particular to minors
to justify its greater regulation.2 3 ' However, in those cases, there is
no justification for regulating minors' rights more stringently than
adults'. 232 The Supreme Court put forth the required justification
when the Court announced the Bellotti factors.2 33 Under the
Schleifer courts' categorical approach, a reviewing court could
"[a]utomatically ... afford less protection to those rights even in

cases in which there was no justification for doing

so. '' 234

This re-

sult would have "far ranging implications," for legislatures "can
pass many laws regulating conduct that would pass intermediate
scrutiny, but fail strict scrutiny. '235 The Schleifer court's categorical
approach would create "a second-class citizenship for all persons
'2 36
under the age of majority.
Thus, the application of strict scrutiny in all Equal Protection
Clause challenges concerning fundamental rights, whether in relation to minors or adults, would bypass these constitutional dilem226
227

See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.

228

Id. at 634.

See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 863 (Michael, J., dissenting).
230 Id.; Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635, n.13 (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 650) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
231 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 864 (Michael, J., dissenting).
232 See Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile
Curfews and the Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1163, 1170 (1984).
233 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. See also supra note 231.
234 See Note, supra note 232, at 1170-71.
235 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 864 (Michael, J., dissenting).
229

236

Id.

at 865.
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mas.2 37 Under this approach, a state could regulate minors' rights
with greater authority than it could adults only when the appropriate interests are present. 238 Thus, after the application of the Bellotti factors, if the appropriate interests are present, and the state's
legislation passes strict scrutiny review, minors' rights may be regu2 39
lated more stringently than adults'.
B.

Evaluation of the City's Stated Purposesfor the
Curfew Ordinance

Upon examining the Charlottesville curfew ordinance, it becomes evident that it cannot withstand strict scrutiny. 240 Despite
the majority's labeling of the city councils' objectives underlying the
ordinance as "laudable," 24 1 the ordinance should have been struck
down for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
242
Amendment.
1. The City's First Purpose: Protecting Juveniles from Crime
The City's first interest of protecting juveniles from crime may
well be a compelling interest; however, this is only part of what is
required under strict scrutiny analysis. 243 In addition to advancing
a compelling state interests, strict scrutiny requires that:
statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn
with 'precision,' and must be 'tailored' to serve their
legitimate objectives ...[I]f there are other, reasona-

ble ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, [the government]
may not choose the way of greater interference. If it
244
acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic means.'
The first problem with the Charlottesville ordinance is that it is
not narrowly drawn to achieve its goal. 245 This is because it lumps
Id.
Id.; Cf. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635 n.13; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75.
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 865 (Michael, J., dissenting); See also Nunez, 114
F. 3d at 135.
240 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 866 (Michael, J., dissenting).
241 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 853.
242 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 866 (Michael, J., dissenting).
237

238
239

243

Id.

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960).
dissenting).
245 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 866 (Michael, J.,
244
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together all minors under 17 and labels them as dangers to society. 2 46 As a result, while only a minute percentage of the group
may actually commit crimes and thus be a danger to society, all
minors (including those who are law-abiding) are treated in the
same fashion by the ordinance. 247 Moreover, the ordinance's exceptions and limited curfew hours do not decrease this deficiency. 248 The city's proclamation of crime prevention does not
warrant the drastic measures of the ordinance; strict scrutiny re249
quires more than this.

2. The City's Second Purpose: Promoting the Safety and Well
Being of Children
The city's second purpose of promoting the safety and well being of children also fails strict scrutiny analysis. 250 This is because
the interest "[I]s not compelling . . . because the curfew was not
designed to be supportive of the parental role."'251 The Supreme
Court has recognized that a "[c]hild is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. ' 252 Further, this duty lies "first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. '253 Thus, parents,
in their primary role, "[a]re entitled to the support of laws designed
' 254
to aid discharge of that responsibility."
Simultaneously, as the Court notes, legal restrictions that support the parental role may enhance a child's chance to have a complete and meaningful

impact on society. 255 Therefore, legal

restrictions that support the parental role justify the enhanced authority of a state in regulating minors' conduct. 256 Thus, when parental authority is united with, and not displaced by, a
governmental interest to restrict minors, the justification for in246

Id.

247

Id.
Id.

248
249

250
251
252
253
254
255

256

Id. at 866-67.
Id. at 867.
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 867 (Michael, J., dissenting).

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
See Prince, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638-39.
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 867 (Michael, J., dissenting).
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creased authority is strengthened. 257 The Ginsberg court provided
a good example of this principle when it prohibited direct sales of
pornography to minors. 258 The approach taken by the Court was
"[c]areful to note, however, that the government did not displace
parental authority: 'the prohibition against sales to minors does not
bar parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their
children."' 259 The Ginsberg law was justified because it deferred to
parental authority, rather than usurped it.260
However, the Charlottesville ordinance makes it illegal for parents
to permit their261children to go out at night, thereby usurping
parental
discretion.
Only parents, and not the city, know their
children well enough to decide if letting them go out at night is a
good idea. 262 Moreover, parents cannot let their children roam independently at night even if they believe it is best for the maturation process.2 63 As a result, this type of "[p]arental discretion is
264
impossible under the ordinance.
Further, there is some evidence that the city council intended
to displace parental discretion via the ordinance. 265 The city council's agenda about the curfew purpose said: (1) parental responsibility should be legally enforced where it is below the norm; and (2)
when parents refuse to exercise parental responsibility, a curfew ordinance will impose a community-wide standard of such responsibility. 266 Thus, it is clear the curfew usurps, rather than supports
the parental role.2 67 Moreover, "the statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because
some parents abuse or neglect children is repugnant to the American tradition. '268 As a result, by attempting to promote the safety
curand well-being of minors by usurping parental authority, "[t]he
269
interest.
governmental
few does not serve a compelling
257
258
259

Id.

266

Id.

267

Id.

268

Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 446-47. (1990).

See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631.
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 867 (Michael, J., dissenting) (quoting Ginsberg,
390 U.S. at 639); See also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-878 (1997).
260 See Schleifer, 159 F.3 d at 867 (Michael, J., dissenting).
Id.
261
262
Id.
263 See Nunez, 114 F. 3d at 952.
264 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 867 (Michael, J., dissenting).
265
Id.

dissenting).
269 See Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 868 (Michael, J.,
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3. The City's Third Purpose: Fostering Parental Responsibility
Likewise, the city's third purpose of aiding parental responsibility does not satisfy strict scrutiny analysis for much of the same
reasons the second purpose failed. 270 As the Supreme Court recognizes in Ginsberg and Bellotti, laws that regulate minors with enhanced authority can be justified if they support the parental role of
child rearing. 271' But parental child rearing cannot be supported
when an ordinance mandates community-wide standards of child
rearing. 272 Thus, "[t]he curfew's attempt to foster and strengthen
parental responsibility by displacing parental authority does not
'273
support a compelling state interest.
C. The Bellotti Factors
Because the Schleifer court concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the correct judicial standard of review, 274 the court never
engaged in a Bellotti factor analysis. However, if strict scrutiny was
applied, as it should have been, the Bellotti factors should become
relevant to decide if the state has the necessary interests that justify
2 75
regulating a minor's behavior more stringently than an adults'.
Once the Bellotti factors are analyzed, it is clear that Charlottesville
"has no '[s]ignificant interest... that is not present in the case of an
adult,' which would justify the prohibition its curfew ordinance
places on the specific activities of minors ....

",276

1. Analysis of the First Bellotti Factor
The first Bellotti factor that determines whether or not the
state has increased authority to regulate minors' conduct is "the peculiar vulnerability of children. ' 277 First, minors mere physical
presence in public during curfew hours does not make them particularly vulnerable to crime more so than adults. 278 If this logic were

correct, "similar concerns could easily support barring the elderly
271
272

Id.
See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639; Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638-39.
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 868 (Michael, J., dissenting).

273

Id.

270

See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 847.
See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-39.
See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1074 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 693 (1981)).
277 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
278 See Note supra note 232, at 1175.
274
275
276
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or handicapped from the streets or even excluding women or particular racial groups from certain areas of some cities. '27 9 Second, vi280
olence is "ubiquitous" and affects minors as well as adults.
Third, minors engaged in legitimate nighttime activities are not specifically vulnerable to crime.2 81 Further, these legitimate activities
"[d]o not involve a minor's special vulnerability to the extent which
justifies differing juvenile proceedings, 282 or special control of obscene materials. '283 Finally, as a result of the curfew prohibiting
minors from engaging in legitimate activities, minors may be deprived of valuable experiences. 28 4 Thus, there is far from the proof
that strict scrutiny requires that children are vulnerable to crime in
a manner which justifies treating them differently from adults.
2.

Analysis of the Second Bellotti Factor

The second Bellotti factor is children's "inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner. ' 285 We must first examine Bellotti's decision, in order to fully understand the situations
when the Bellotti court intended this factor to apply.28 6 Bellotti
concerned a statute requiring parental notification before a child
had an abortion. 287 The Court said generally, minors and adults are
equally protected against government deprivations. 288 Then the
Court noted that "[t]he states validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences. 2 8 9 In deciding
the case, the Court held that a state may, in some circumstances,
require parental notification in order for a minor to have an abor279

Id.

See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137.
See Johnson, 658 F. 2d at 1073.
282 See, e.g., In re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1978).
280
281

283
284

See Johnson, 658 F. 2d at 1073.

285

See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.

286

Id. at 622 (1979).

287

Id.

288

Id. at 635.

See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137; See also Note, supra note 232 at 1175-76
(saying "Banning children from the streets... [I]s an attempt to shelter them from
some unspecified future harm - an attempt that simultaneously forecloses many
beneficial opportunities").

289 Id.
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tion because that decision "[r]aises profound moral and religious
290
concerns" for some people.
However, the activities confronting minors under a juvenile
curfew ordinance, such as movements, associations, and other First
Amendment rights, "[d]o not involve any 'critical decisions' on the
part of minors. '291 One can see the possible long-term, life-altering, serious consequences surrounding an abortion; 292 however, it is
virtually impossible to see these consequences in a decision, with
parental guidance, to go to a late night movie. 293 On the same token, the decision to go out during curfew hours does not necessarily
lead to violence (the curbing of which the ordinances sought to protect); in fact, most decisions by juveniles never have any serious
consequences. 294 Again, it is hard to see how the activities prohib-

ited by the ordinance will keep children from making critical decisions in a hasty, uninformed manner.
3. Analysis of the Third Bellotti Factor
The Third Bellotti factor is "[tihe importance of the parental
role in child rearing. '295 As is evident in the Charlottesville city
council's agenda concerning the purposes of the curfew, 296 the cur-

few "[r]ests upon the implicit assumption that the traditional family
unit, in which parents exercise control over their children's activities, has dissolved in many areas of the city."' 297 While this may be
true in some instances, the ordinance "[g]racelessly arrogates unto
itself and to the police the precious rights of parenthood" in countless other families where the parent-child relationship is
298
flourishing.
Further, as evidenced by the application of the second Bellotti
factor, the activities prohibited under the curfew do not usually involve decisions with serious, long-term, life-shaping consequences. 299 "When such choices are not at stake, the principle of
290

Id. at 640.

See Johnson, 658 F. 2d at 1073.
See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 622.
293
See Johnson, 658 F. 2d at 1073.
294
See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137.
295
See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
296
See supra Part V (B) (2) and accompanying text.
297
See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137.
Id.
298
299
See, e.g., Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137; Johnson, 658 F. 2d at 1073; see also
Schleifer supra note 229, at 1177-78.
291

292
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protecting the parental role cuts against the exercise of state power
and requires the government to defer to parents on issues that
merely involve authority over children. '30 0 This flows from the
principles announced by the Supreme Court that parents have the
primary role in regulating the activities of their children. 30 1 Thus,
this curfew ordinance hinders, rather than fosters, parental responsibility,30 2 and like the other Bellotti factors in this case, does not
justify treating children differently under thew law than adults.
D.

The Void for Vagueness Doctrine-FacialChallenges and the
Charlottesville FirstAmendment Exception
Due process principles are contained within the void for vagueness doctrine. 30 3 Under this doctrine, an ordinance must (1) "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited;" and (2) do so
"manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. ' 304 Moreover, when criminal penalties are possible, the
level of preciseness with which the ordinance must be drawn to operate is greater. 30 5 This is necessary so that enforcement of the curfew is not left to "purely subjective decisions of the police,
prosecutor, and juries . . .- 306 The ordinance itself must be extremely clear in defining what is legal and illegal for police and citizens. 30 7 As a result of the Charlottesville ordinance imposing
criminal sanctions, 30 8 this increased definiteness is necessary in this
case.
Generally, when facial challenges are successful, all applications of the challenged ordinance are invalidated. 30 9 As a result,
the Schleifer court says this should not be done frequently. 310 However, the Schleifer court mistakenly says that courts should use judicial restraint and avoid striking down a statute for facial
See Note, supra note 232, at 1178.
See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
302
See, e.g., Johnson, 658 F. 2d at 1074; Waters, 711 F. Supp at 1137; Schleifer,
159 F. 3d at 868 (dissenting opinion).
303 See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F. 3d 671, 675 (9th
Cir. 1996).
304 See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
305
See Village of Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 498-99.
306 See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
307 See Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 868 (Michael, J., dissenting).
300

301

'w8
309
310

See

CHARLO'rESVILLE, VA., CODE

§ 17-7 (h).

See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974).
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 853 and 868.
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vagueness. 311 Statutes are not frequently facially invalidated because of the principles of judicial restraint, but "because few facial
3 12
challenges satisfy the high burden normally imposed.
However, there is an exception to the general rule of facial
vagueness challenges: "[an] ordinance need not be vague in all applications if it reaches a 'substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct."' 3 13 This exception is to avoid the chilling effect
vague statutes have on the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights. 31 4 As the Supreme Court said: "the danger of [a] chilling
effect upon the exercise of vital first Amendment rights must be
guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform [citizens]
what is being proscribed. '' 31 5 Thus, in this case, because a "substantial amount" 31 6 of constitutional protected activities can be chilled,
a facial challenge is permitted 31 7 and a case-by-case analysis of par3 18
ticular applications of the ordinance is not required.
The Schleifer court says that because "core First Amendment
activities" are adequately protected by the ordinances' exception,
''marginal cases" can be decided through specific applications of the
ordinance on a case-by-case basis. 31 9 However, core activities
should not be the basis of analysis; the basis of analysis should be if
the ordinance "reaches 'a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct." 320 The Schleifer court says "political protest
and religious worship" will be protected by the ordinance. 321 However, the First Amendment extends its sphere of protection far beyond this.322 As a result of the Schleifer court's deferring to caseby-case application challenges, there seems to be a sizeable threat
323
of chilling constitutionally protected conduct.
311
312
313
314

315

Id. at 869 (Michael, J., dissenting).
Id.
See Nunez, 114 F. 3d at 940 (quoting Village of Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 494).
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 869 (Michael, J., dissenting).
Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).

316

317 Cf. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (allowing a facial challenge because the
"law reached a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct").
318
See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 869 (Michael, J., dissenting).
319

Id. at 854.

320

See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.8 (quoting Village of Hoffman, 455 U.S. at

494).
321
322
323

See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 854.
Id. at 870 (Michael, J., dissenting).
Id.; Cf. 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 58 F. 3d

988, 993-94 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that "courts must permit" facial
challenges when a substantial chance of chilling First Amendment rights is present
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The Charlottesville First Amendment exception is impermissibly vague because it forces people "of common intelligence... [to]
guess at its meaning and ... to its application. '324 The exception
specifically covers freedom of speech and assembly. 325 But what
326
exactly is speech and assembly is not clear in the exception.
Moreover, other First Amendment rights are not even mentioned
in the exception. 327 "The questions above are difficult enough for
courts, Congress, and constitutional scholars, let alone for someone
with no legal training. '328 And when these tough questions can be
answered, the result is usually uncertain and requires a detailed
analysis of the specific facts of the case. 329 Further, the field of constitutional law is in constant flux, often getting more complex, every
day. 330 "As a result, criminal conduct cannot be defined by simply
referring to the title (First Amendment) or subtitle (speech or as331
sembly) of a particular statute.
Further, the chief of police of Charlottesville, through his testimony, established the ordinance's ambiguity. 332 The chief was
questioned as to whether two teens talking about politics in a coffee
shop during curfew hours violated the ordinance. 333 The chief responded that technically it was a violation, but the officer has discretion to determine if there was a violation or not.334 This is a
perfect example how arbitrary discretion combined with imprecise
drafting renders the ordinance void for vagueness.
The Schleifer court says that Charlottesville was placed "between a rock and a hard place" in drafting the ordinance. 335 If no
First amendment exception was included, the ordinance would be
unconstitutional for not protecting First Amendment rights, and if
because it [the chilling effect] "can be effectively alleviated only through a facial
challenge.") (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S.
750, 757 (1988))).
Connaly v. General Constr., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
324
325 See CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA., CODE § 17-7 (b) (8).
326 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 871 (Michael, J., dissenting).
327 Id.
328

Id.

329

Id.

330

Id.

331
332

See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 871 (Michael, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.

333
334
335

Id.
Id. at 853.
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one is included, it is void for vagueness.3 36 While this may be true,

the Supreme Court said:
Our constitution is designed to maximize individual
freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty. Statutory limitations on those freedoms are examined for
substance authority and content as well as for definite33 7
ness or certainty of expression.

Legislatures have difficulties drafting statutes that will pass constitutional muster and the judiciary has difficulties interpreting
them. 338 However, both must be done so persons of common intelligence need not guess at the statute's meaning. 339 "Although we
may 'appreciate the difficulties of drafting precise laws, we must
require that all statutes meet constitutional standards for clarity.' ' '340 Thus, notwithstanding the city council's problems with
drafting a constitutional statute, "the danger of chilling the exercise
of constitutionally protected activity arises because of the uncertainty associated with the First Amendment exception."' 341 As a result, the ordinance is void for vagueness.
CONCLUSION

The 4th Circuit refused to acknowledge that minors and adults
have fundamental equal rights under the constitution. 342 Further,
the 4th circuit, by applying intermediate scrutiny, failed to follow
the lead of the 5th and 9th circuits (who both applied strict scrutiny). 343 As a result, thousands of innocent, law-abiding minors are
quarantined to their homes 33 hours during each week. Moreover,
since the Supreme Court refuses to grant certiorari on the issue, 344
it is likely that more decisions like this will follow. The 4th circuit
had a chance to push juvenile's rights in the direction it should be
headed, namely, forward. Instead, by upholding Charlottesville's
336 See Schleifer, 114 F. 3d at 853.
337 See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
338 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518 (1948).
339 See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 694
(1969) (concurring opinion).
340 See Schleifer, 159 F. 3d at 874 (Michael, J., dissenting) (quoting City of
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465 (1987)).
341 Id. at 874.
343

Id. at 847.
Id.

3"

See supra Part I (B).

342
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juvenile curfew ordinance, the court delivered a devastating blow to
juvenile rights.
Jason T Ross

